Publications: 

(hide abstracts)

 

Product Market Competition and the Severity of Distressed Asset Sales

(with Vinicius Carrasco and João Manoel Pinho de Mello), forthcoming, Review of Finance

 

This paper explores the effect of an industry's market structure on the liquidation value of assets. We show that when firms with financial constraints compete for the gains arising from market concentration, they expend insufficient efforts to deploy assets across industries, leading to significant liquidation discounts when compared to an efficient benchmark. Equilibrium distress costs and private costs of leverage should increase with the rents linked to concentration in the product market.

 

 

When (and How) to Favor Incumbents in Optimal Dynamic Procurement Auctions

(with Vinicius Carrasco and Paulo Orenstein), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 62 (2016) 52-61 

 

We consider the problem faced by a benevolent government agency that procures in each of T>1 periods an indivisible good from one of N>1 firms. The procurement process is complicated by the superior information possessed by firms about their time-varying production costs and efficiency-enhancing efforts. We fully characterize the optimal dynamic procurement. To reduce firms' informational rents, the government introduces distortions along two dimensions: when selecting from which firm to procure the good and when providing incentives towards efforts in cost reduction. Both distortions interact in a non-trivial way. Firms that draw lower cost parameters in the first period are favored in the selection process in all later periods, which allows for the provision of more powerful incentives. 

 

 

Coordinated Strategic Defaults and Financial Fragility in a Costly State Verification Model 

(with Vinicius Carrasco), Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 23 (1), 2014

pdf  

 

Diversification through a financial intermediary has the benefit of transforming loans that need costly monitoring into bank deposits that do not. We show that financial intermediation in a costly state verification model has a cost not yet analyzed: it allows for the existence of multiple equilibria, some of which are characterized by borrowers defaulting on their loans because they expect other borrowers to do the same (i.e. bad equilibria arise due to strategic complementarities in entrepreneurs’ actions). We propose two mechanisms that fully implement the desired equilibrium allocation.

 

 

In Portuguese 

 

Universidade pública deve ser grátis para quem pode pagar? 
(com Eduardo Azevedo), Revista Brasileira de Economia, vol. 66 (1), 2012 

 

O governo brasileiro oferece anualmente mais de um milhão de vagas em universidades públicas e gratuitas. Entretanto, a educação superior no Brasil é altamente progressiva. Neste artigo estudamos como a cobrança pela educação pública de alunos com elevada renda altera o equilíbrio no mercado de educação superior. Tal taxa encoraja alunos mais ricos a buscar a educação particular e aumenta o acesso de alunos carentes às universidades públicas. Mostramos que uma pequena taxa cobrada gera ganhos de bem-estar com uma cota inferior de cerca de R$100.000 por aluno carente extra atendido pelo sistema público.

 

Working Papers:

 

 

Dynamic Multitask Moral Hazard 

(with Vinicius Carrasco)

abstract

 

 

 

Non-Refereed:

 

 

Book Chapters

 

A Teoria Econômica das PPPs: Concessões, Participação do Governo e Renovações   

(com Vinicius Carrasco e João Manoel Pinho de Mello), Parcerias Público Privadas: Experiências, Desafios e Propostas, organizado por Gesner Oliveira e Luiz Chrisostomo de Oliveira Filho.  

 

 

Other

 

A história como uma janela para o futuro

(Vem Pra Rua Brasil - 19 de Outubro de 2014)